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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant was charged and convicted of rape in a trial 
which commenced on March 13, 19 86 in Utah County before the 
Honorable Boyd L. Park. 
After the jury was sworn and opening statements made, 
the prosecution moved to clear the courtroom of spectators, 
including the family of the defendant for so long as the 
prosecutrix was to testify, save for a Rape Crisis Center 
Worker (Transcript, page 17, line 18) pursuant to U.C.A. 1953, 
78-7-4. 
The defense counsel objected twice to the motion (Transcript 
page 18, line 7) and (Transcript page 20, Line 7). The trial 
court granted the motion and the court was so cleared of all 
spectators excluding the Rape Crisis worker. 
The defendant was sentenced and his motion for a new trial 
on the issues above was denied June 10, 1986. The defendant 
appeals the denial of his motion for new trial and the granting 
of the trial motion to exclude the spectators. 
The defendant's prior appeal on the same issues therein was 
dismissed by the Court on April 22, 1987 on the grounds that 
there was no final order and remanded for that purpose to the Fourth 
Judicial District Court for Utah County, State of Utah. 
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STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT 
It has been held that U.C.A. 78-7-4 does not apply to 
criminal trials in that it is violative of Section 12, Article 
I of the Constitution of the State of Utah and the Sixth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
Excluding spectators, including the family of defendant, 
violates the Constitution of the United States and of the 
State of Utah without a showing that such exclusion is justified. 
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ARGUMENT 
The appellant is seeking review of a trial court's 
decision to exclude all spectators from the courtroom during 
a rape victim's testimony where those spectators are family 
and friends of the defendant and of the victim and there is 
no evidence of disturbance or adverse behavior of those 
spectators. 
Necessarily excluded from the issue is a discussion of 
when and how far a judge may go in excluding spectators who 
may or do cause disturbances or intimidation or when merely 
casual CM perversely interested spectators may be excluded. 
This Court has acknowledged the defendant's right to 
a public trial in rape and other cases as being founded upon 
the Utah Constitution, Article I, Sec. 12 and the Sixth 
Amendment of the Federal Constitution, State v. Harding, 
635 p.2d 36 (1981). 
In State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 P. 480, the courtroom 
was cleared of spectators (save the sister of the prosecutrix) 
after the prosecutrix became hysterical. Later in the trial 
the exclusion was lifted. The Court concluded that the 
defendant was denied a public trial. 
In the case at bar, the trial judge excluded all spectators 
during the prosecutrix's testimony but unlike Bonza there was 
no reason stated. The prosecution stated in the instant case 
(Trial Transcript page 17, line 21) that the prosecutrix was 
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"nervous" and that she was probably going to be intimidated 
by the presence of her family and the defendant's family but 
there is no indication the trial judge made a finding o£ that or 
that it was even considered by the trial judge. There was no 
showing on why the prosecutor thought that the prosecutrix may 
be intimidated. 
In any event, the appellant contends that unless there is a 
showing of acts of intimidation by the family of the prosecutrix or 
the defendant, that exclusion would be improper and indeed the 
constitutional safeguard of a public trial is in part designed to 
provide a degree of intimidation in the sense that spectators help 
deter perjury and other miscarriages of justice, State V. Harding, 
Supra. State v. Beckstead, 88 P.2d 461, (concurring opinion p. 464). 
The harm of the exclusion in the case at bar was that those persons 
that should have been present were excluded for no justifiable 
reason and that the reason the prosecution wanted them excluded 
is one of the most important reasons the Constitutional provisions 
were drafted to encourage their presence. 
In State v. Beckstead, 88 P.2d 461, the Court held that 
in prosecutions of an intimate sexual nature (referring to 
U.C.A. 78-7-4) that a reasonable number of defendant's family 
and friends must be left in the courtroom during such testimony, 
the Statute notwithstanding. 
This Court has ruled that where a defendant has been denied 
a public trial, his prejudice is presumed, and he need not show 
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actual prejudice. State v. Jordan, 57 Utah 612, 196 P. 525. 
In Jordan, supra, as in the instant case, the trial judge 
apparently ruled for complete exclusion on the basis of the 
Statute (both cases involve rape and the Statutes are essentially 
the same). The Jordan case, supra, the Beckstead case, supra, 
and the Bonza case, supra, dealt with what is now codified as 
U.C.A. 78-7-4. The cases in Utah have uniformly held that it 
is impropre to rely on the Statute to exclude interested, non-
obtrusive spectators. 
U.C.A. 78-7-4 has been interpreted in the above cases in 
various ways as to insure the constitutional rights of defendants. 
However, the Statute itself, in granting discretion to a trial 
court to exclude, should be invalid on its face as well as 
applied in the instant case and similar cases. 
The defendant does not argue that there are no justifiable 
reasons for the exclusion as in the case at bar, but the defendant 
does argue that there are no justifiable reasons counterbalancing 
his right to a public trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should remand this case back to the trial 
court for a new trial because the defendant was denied 
a public trial. 
Respectfully submitted 
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